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Abstract
After an increase in visibility for sexual harassment cases in 1991, employers have had to treat allegations of
sexual misconduct more seriously now that juries have the authority to award both compensatory and
punitive damages. Many employers and employees remain confused, however, as to what conduct is
considered unlawful sexual harassment. This article explains how courts have analyzed allegations of unlawful
sexual harassment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by discussing what a court must find before
it will impose liability. In response to the very real and immediate demand for a straightforward discussion of
the law concerning sexual harassment in the workplace, this article provides a summary that is hoped to
educate and assist both employers and employees. This article also discusses relevant sections of the Civil
Rights Act of 1991.
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WHAT CAN YOU SAY, WHERE CAN YOU SAY
IT, AND TO WHOM? A GUIDE TO
UNDERSTANDING AND PREVENTING
UNLAWFUL SEXUAL HARASSMENT
DAVID ALLEN LARSONt
This nation has finally begun to discuss sexual harassment at the
workplace.' When Professor Anita Hill alleged that Supreme Court
Justice Clarence Thomas sexually harassed her while she was an em-
ployee and he was Chairman at the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, millions of Americans tuned in to watch the televised
proceedings. Although viewers' reactions may have ranged from
sympathy to anger to embarrassment, the hearings did prompt em-
ployers and employees to closely examine their own workplace
experiences.
2
Additionally, sexual harassment has received increased attention
this past year because Congress and the White House finally reached
an agreement on the much-debated Civil Rights Act of 1991.3 This
new legislation, which President George Bush signed on November
21, 1991, significantly expands the remedies for unlawful sexual har-
assment and provides that victims of unlawful intentional discrimina-
tion are now entitled to a jury trial. Employers must treat
allegations of sexual misconduct more seriously now that juries have
the authority to award both compensatory and punitive damages.
t Professor of Law, Creighton University School of Law. Professor-in-Resi-
dence, United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (1990-91); J.D., Uni-
versity of Illinois College of Law; LL.M., University of Pennsylvania Law School. The
author thanks attorney Roger K. Johnson and Professor Joseph Allegretti for their
comments concerning an earlier draft.
1. This increased attention is certainly far overdue. Studies have revealed that a
high percentage of women have been victims of sexual harassment. For instance, in
1981 the United States Merit Systems Protection Board interviewed women who were
working for the federal government. Forty-two percent reported they had been vic-
tims of sexual harassment in the workplace. When the study was repeated in 1987,
again over 40% of female federal employees reported incidents of sexual harassment.
When sexual harassment occurs, both employers and employees lose. The United
States Merit Systems Protection Board concluded that sexual harassment cost the gov-
ernment $267,000,000 as a result of losses in productivity, sick leave costs, and em-
ployee replacement costs from May, 1985, to May, 1987. Office of Policy and
Evaluation, United States Merit Systems Protection Board, Sexual Harassment in the
Federal Government: An Update 16, 39 (June, 1988).
2. Justice Clarence Thomas was sworn in as a United States Supreme Court Jus-
tice in October of 1991.
3. See infra, notes 128-31 and accompanying text.
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Many employers and employees remain confused, however, as to
what conduct is considered unlawful sexual harassment. This Article
explains how courts have analyzed allegations of unlawful sexual
harassment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by discuss-
ing what a court must find before it will impose liability.4 In re-
sponse to the very real and immediate demand for a straightforward
discussion of the law concerning sexual harassment in the workplace,
this Article provides a summary that will hopefully educate and as-
sist both employers and employees.5 This Article also discusses rele-
vant sections of the Civil Rights Act of 1991.
THEORIES OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT
QUID PRO Quo
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it "an unlawful
employment practice for an employer.., to discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin."16 Courts have determined that this
statutory language prohibits two different types of unlawful sexual
harassment: quid pro quo and hostile environment.
The quid pro quo form of unlawful sexual harassment is gener-
ally easier to understand. Quid pro quo sexual harassment occurs
when an employer "conditions the granting of an economic or other
job benefit upon the receipt of sexual favors from a subordinate, or
4. This Title prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, and
national origin.
5. Sexual harassment claims can take a number of different forms. For instance,
unlawful discrimination charges may be brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1988). Sexual harassment victims may also
assert violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988) (which provides that any person who, under
the authority of the government, deprives rights, privileges, or immunities secured by
the Constitution and laws shall be liable to the party injured). See Dwyer v. Smith,
867 F.2d 184 (4th Cir. 1989) (holding that, although plaintiff's evidence was sufficient
to avoid dismissal of her § 1983 claim, she was collaterally estopped from further liti-
gating), and Lipsett v. University of P.R., 864 F.2d 881, 897 (1st Cir. 1988) (stating that,
although state officials directly engaging in sexual discrimination are subject to § 1983
liability, those officials are not liable for the actions of supervisors). A myriad of tort
common law theories are available, including assault, battery, and intentional infliction
of emotional distress. See Wing v. JAMB Property Management Corp., 714 P.2d 916
(Colo. Ct. App. 1985) (holding allegations of sexual harassment, ridicule, threats, and
humiliation sufficient to avoid dismissal of tort claim for outrageous conduct). Plain-
tiffs may also be able to assert newly developing wrongful discharge theories. See
Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974) (finding a bad faith
breach of plaintiff's employment contract when she was discharged for refusing to
date her foreman). As stated in the text, this Article will concentrate on sexual har-
assment claims alleging a violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
6. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1988).
SEXUAL HARASSMENT
punishes that subordinate for refusing to comply."'7 In this situation,
an employer is forcing an employee to accede to sexual demands. If
the employee refuses, he or she will either forfeit job benefits (in-
cluding continued employment, promotion, or salary increases) or
suffer tangible job detriments (such as demotion or discharge).
8
Thus, the employee must prove that submission to the employer's re-
quests was either an express or implied condition of receiving job
benefits, or that a tangible job detriment resulted from the em-
ployee's failure to submit to the sexual demands.
A plaintiff alleging quid pro quo sexual harassment must estab-
lish that:
(1) he or she is a member of a protected group,
(2) the sexual advances were unwelcome,
(3) the harassment was sexually motivated, or based on sex,
and that
(4) the advances affected a tangible aspect of employment. 9
Quid pro quo sexual harassment necessarily involves owners, su-
pervisors, and managers because persons in those positions have the
power to grant benefits or threaten employment related detriments.
Employers have been held strictly liable for the misconduct of those
supervisory employees who have plenary authority over hiring, ad-
7. Lipsett, 864 F.2d at 897 (extending VII standard for proving discriminatory
treatment to alleged discrimination in violation of Title IX).
8. Highlander v. K.F.C. Nat'l. Management Co., 805 F.2d 644, 648 (6th Cir. 1986).
9. Sparks v. Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc., 830 F.2d 1554, 1564 (11th Cir. 1987). A
number of courts have described the prima facie case for unlawful quid pro quo sexual
harassment as including a fifth element. The United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit stated that the plaintiff must also prove that the employer knew or
should have known of the harassment and took no remedial action. Spencer v. Gen-
eral Elec. Co., 894 F.2d 651, 658 (4th Cir. 1990). The court went on to explain, however,
that when a supervisor is committing sexual hassassment "this element is automati-
cally met because under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) knowledge of the harassment is imputed
to the employer through its agent-supervisor." Id. at 658-59 n.10 (citing Spencer v.
General Elec. Co., 697 F. Supp. 204, 217 (E.D. Va. 1988) (citing Meritor Say. Bank v.
Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986)). The Sixth Circuit stated that a plaintiff must establish
respondeat superior liability. Highlander, 805 F.2d at 648. See also Showalter v. Al-
lison Reed Group, Inc., 767 F. Supp. 1205 (D.R.I. 1991). The Highlander court immedi-
ately added, however, that employers are strictly liable for their supervisors' quid pro
quo sexual harassment because "knowledge of an employment decision based on im-
permissible sexual factors is imputed to the employer." Highlander, 805 F.2d at 648-49.
The First Circuit, on the other hand, described a prima facie case of quid pro quo sex-
ual harassment as having only two elements. Lipsett, 864 F.2d at 898. According to
that court the plaintiff must prove that:
(1) he or she was subject to unwelcome sexual advances by a supervisor or
teacher and
(2) that his or her reaction to these advances affected tangible aspects of his
or her compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment or ed-
ucational training.
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vancement, dismissal, and discipline.10
In a quid pro quo case, an employee must establish causation and
show that he or she was denied a job benefit or suffered a job detri-
ment for refusing the demands of the employer or its agent. Where
an employee was transferred between business locations because she
could not cope with the high volume of business at the original work-
place; where she admitted that her performance was adversely af-
fected by her inability to respond to the high volume; and where
there was no evidence that the supervisor who made the sexual de-
mands participated in any way in the decision to terminate plaintiff's
employment for her extended absences, the employer was not held
liable."
It is helpful to examine more closely the preceding outline
describing the elements that a quid pro quo plaintiff must establish.
Regarding the first requirement, that the plaintiff be a member "of a
'protected group,' Title VII protects both males and females from
sexual harassment.' 2 Consequently both males and females will be
members of a "protected group."
As to the second requirement, in order to determine what is "un-
welcome" one must ask "whether sexual advances were uninvited
and offensive or unwanted from the standpoint of the employee.'
i3
It should be noted that an employee's own use of foul language or
sexual innuendo in a consensual setting does not waive his or her
legal protections against unwelcome harassment. In Showalter v. Al-
lison Reed Group, Inc.,i4 a male employee who had boasted about his
sexual exploits and his possession of x-rated videos, and who had
made repeated lewd proposals to a female co-worker, expressly re-
10. Highlander, 805 F.2d at 648. The United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit stated that the prevailing view in the United States Courts of Appeals is
that employers will be held liable for unlawful sexual harassment when a supervisor
has plenary authority regarding employment decisions. Craig v. Y & Y Snacks, Inc.,
721 F.2d 77, 80-81 (3d Cir. 1983) (citing Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 910
(11th Cir. 1982); Miller v. Bank of America, 600 F.2d 211, 213 (9th Cir. 1979); Barnes v.
Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 993 (D.C. Cir. 1977)). The Third Circuit rejected the argument
that employers should not be held liable under Title VII unless they have actual or
constructive knowledge of the sexual harassment at the time it occurs. Id. at 80. The
Fourth Circuit explained that its requirement that the employer knew or should have
known of the harassment and took no remedial action is automatically met when su-
pervisors commit sexual harassment because, according to the Title VII definition of
"employer" in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(b), "knowledge of the harassment is imputed to the
employer through its agent-supervisor." Spencer, 894 F.2d at 658 n.10.
11. Highlander, 805 F.2d at 649.
12. Showalter v. Allison Reed Group, Inc., 767 F. Supp. 1205, 1211 (D.R.I. 1991)
(citing Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 903 (11th Cir. 1982)).
13. Showalter, 767 F. Supp. at 1211 (citing Chamberlin v. 101 Realty, Inc., 915 F.2d
777, 784 (1st Cir. 1990)).
14. 767 F. Supp. 1205 (D.R.I. 1991).
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jected a supervisor's invitation to join an ongoing sexual affair with
the manager's secretary. Because the employee manifested his dis-
pleasure clearly and unambiguously, he satisfied this part of his
proof.
15
Concerning the third requirement, typically there is little ques-
tion as to whether the request is sexually motivated. Cases address-
ing allegations of hostile environment, however, have established
that advances need not be explicitly sexual in order to amount to a
sexual advance.
16
The fourth requirement for a finding of quid pro quo sexual har-
assment is that the sexual advance or sexual comment affect a tangi-
ble aspect of employment. If an employer's request imposes a new
condition on the plaintiff's employment, a "tangible" aspect of em-
ployment is affected.17 For example, if an employee must accede to
an employer's request in order to keep his or her job, the obvious
tangible job benefit the plaintiff receives for succumbing to the har-
assment will be the retention of his or her employment.
Finally, employers are held strictly liable in cases of quid pro quo
sexual harassment.' 8 If the harasser is the employee's own supervi-
sor, the employer's liability is direct. It does not matter whether the
employer knew, or should have known, about the supervisor's con-
duct.19 The United States Supreme Court confirmed this rule in 1986
when it approvingly stated that "courts have consistently held em-
ployers liable for the discriminatory discharges of employees by su-
pervisory personnel, whether or not the employer knew, should have
known, or approved of the supervisor's actions."
20
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has
explained that once an employee has established a prima facie case of
liability, an inference of quid pro quo sexual harassment will arise.21
At this point, a burden shifts to the defendant to produce some evi-
dence to rebut this presumption. This evidence must take the form
of legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the employment decision
in question. If this presumption is successfully rebutted, the burden
of producing evidence returns to the plaintiff to show that the de-
15. Id. at 1211-12. The issue of "unwelcomeness" will be further discussed in the
following section on hostile environment.
16. For further discussion, see infra at notes 40-48 and accompanying text.
17. See Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 909 (11th Cir. 1982) (explaining
that "as in the typical disparate treatment case, the employee must prove that she was
deprived of a job benefit which she was otherwise qualified to receive because of the
employer's use of a prohibited criterion in making the employment decision.").
18. Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 255 n.6 (1983). See infra note 10.
19. Spencer, 894 F.2d at 658 n.10.
20. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 70-71 (1986).
21. Spencer, 894 F.2d at 658-59.
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fendant's suggested nondiscriminatory reasons are pretextual and
that the actions in question were based on a sexually discriminatory
criterion. The ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that
unlawful conduct occurred always remains with the plaintiff,
however.
HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT
Allegations of hostile environment sexual harassment are more
confusing than charges alleging quid pro quo sexual harassment. In
Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson,22 the United States Supreme Court
described how a court should determine whether unlawful hostile en-
vironment sexual harassment has occurred.
23
In Meritor Savings Bank, a vice president and manager of a
branch bank allegedly made repeated sexual demands and had inter-
course with the plaintiff some forty to fifty times. Additionally, it
was alleged that the manager fondled the plaintiff in the presence of
co-workers, pursued her into the women's restroom, exposed himself
to her, and on several occasions forcibly raped her.
24
In its discussion, the United States Supreme Court distinguished
quid pro quo sexual harassment from hostile environment sexual
harassment. The Court stated that the language of Title VII is not
limited to "economic" or "tangible" discrimination. 25 Instead, "the
phrase 'terms, conditions, or privileges of employment' evinces a con-
gressional intent 'to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treat-
ment of men and women' in employment.
'26
The Court explained, however, that not all workplace conduct
that may be described as "harassment" affects a "term, condition, or
privilege" of employment within the meaning of Title VII. The
22. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
23. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit identified an in-
triguing question that deserves further examination. According to that court, the cir-
cumstances that give rise to quid pro quo sexual harassment claims are common to
both men and women. The theory of hostile environment sexual harassment, how-
ever, arises from the belief that a woman's sexuality defines her in our society. There
is a "sexual power asymmetry between men and women" because men are not simi-
larly defined by their sexuality. This understanding, when combined with the history
of workplace discrimination against women, may create causes of action for hostile en-
vironment sexual harassment that are only available to women. Drinkwater v. Union
Carbide Corp., 904 F.2d 853, 861 n.15 (3d Cir. 1990) (citing C. MACKINNON, SEXUAL
HARASSMENT 151, 174 (1979)). Those further interested in this question will find sub-
stantial thoughtful discussion in the writings of Catherine MacKinnon, among others.
24. Meritor Say. Bank, 477 U.S. at 60.
25. Id. at 64.
26. Id. (quoting Sprogis v. United Airlines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th Cir.
1977)).
[Vol. 25
SEXUAL HARASSMENT
Supreme Court cited Rogers v. EEOC27 for the proposition that the
"mere utterance of an ethnic or racial epithet which engenders offen-
sive feelings in an employee" will not affect the conditions of employ-
ment sufficiently to violate Title VII.28 Rather, "[f]or sexual
harassment to be actionable, it must be sufficiently severe or perva-
sive 'to alter the conditions of [the victim's] employment and create
an abusive working environment.' ",29
Additionally, the Court stated that "the gravamen of any sexual
harassment claim is that the alleged sexual advance be 'unwel-
come.' "30 The Court took great care to distinguish the term "volun-
tary" from the term "unwelcome." It emphasized that although a
plaintiff's conduct may be regarded as voluntary, in the sense that
the plaintiff was not forced to participate against his or her will, this
characterization is not a defense to a sexual harassment claim
brought under Title VII.
31
Although an employee's voluntariness in submitting to advances
may be immaterial, the Supreme Court added that an employee's
sexually provocative speech or dress may be relevant in determining
whether he or she found particular sexual advances unwelcome. The
Court cautioned, however, that while there is no per se rule against
admissibility of this type of evidence, a trial court must carefully
weigh the probative value of such evidence against its potential for
unfair prejudice.
32
In deciding that this evidence was relevant, the Supreme Court
relied in part on the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
guidelines. Those guidelines state:
(b) In determining whether alleged conduct constitutes sex-
ual harassment, the Commission will look at the record as a
whole and at the totality of the circumstances, such as the
nature of the sexual advances and the context in which the
alleged incidents occurred. The determination of the legality
of a particular action will be made from the facts, on a case
by case basis.
33
To conclude its discussion of unlawful sexual harassment, the
Supreme Court addressed the question of when courts should hold an
employer liable for hostile environment sexual harassment. Re-
jecting the Court of Appeal's position that an employer should be
27. 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972).
28. Meritor Say. Bank, 477 U.S. at 67 (quoting Rogers, 454 F.2d at 238).
29. Id. (quoting Henson, 682 F.2d at 904) (emphasis added).
30. Id. at 68 (citing Equal Employment Opportunity Commission guidelines 29
C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)) (emphasis added).
31. Id.
32. Id. at 69.
33. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(b) (1991).
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strictly liable for a supervisor's sexual advances that create a hostile
environment (even where an employer did not know nor reasonably
could have known of the alleged conduct), the Court refused to issue
a definitive rule on employer liability. Rather, the Court simply
stated that Congress wanted courts to be guided by agency
principles.
3 4
The Court's refusal to issue a definitive rule addressing employer
liability has resulted in substantial litigation. The Supreme Court did
state that courts should not always hold employers automatically lia-
ble for hostile environment sexual harassment committed by their
supervisors.35 It added, however, that the absence of notice to an em-
ployer will not necessarily insulate the employer from liability.
36
Additionally, it rejected the argument that the mere existence of a
grievance procedure and policy, combined with an employee's failure
to invoke that procedure, willinsulate an employer from liability.
37
The Supreme Court declared that an anti-discrimination policy
will not protect an employer if:
(1) the policy does not address sexual discrimination in par-
ticular, thus alerting employees to the employer's inter-
est in correcting that form of discrimination, or -
(2) the company's grievance procedure requires an employee
to complain first to his or her supervisor who, as in Mer-
itor Savings Bank, may be the person harassing the
plaintiff (making it understandable that the employee
did not invoke the procedure).
3 8
Thus, the Court identified a number of factors to consider when
determining whether an unlawful hostile environment exists. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit summarized the
prima facie case for unlawful hostile environment sexual harassment
by stating that a plaintiff must show that:
(1) she [he] was subjected to sexual advances, requests for
sexual favors, or other verbal or physical conduct of a
sexual nature;
(2) that the conduct was unwelcome; and
(3) that the conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive to
alter the conditions of her [his] employment and create
an abusive working environment.39
34. Meritor Say. Bank, 477 U.S. at 72.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 72-73.
39. E.E.O.C. v. Hacienda Hotel, 881 F.2d 1504, 1514-15 (9th Cir. 1989) (quoting Jor-
dan v. Clark, 847 F.2d 1368, 1373 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S.Ct. 786 (1989) (quot-
ing Henson, 682 F.2d at 904)).
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A CLOSER LOOK AT HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT
Since the United States Supreme Court's decision in Meitor
Savings Bank, there have been a number of cases involving allega-
tions of hostile environment sexual harassment. These cases further
explain the factors that combine to create a hostile environment.
PROHIBITED CONDUCT
To determine whether a hostile environment exists, one must
first focus on the allegedly offensive conduct. Initially, one should
recognize that it is not necessary that the plaintiff prove explicit sex-
ual advances or sexual overtones in order to establish a hostile envi-
ronment. For instance, in McKinney v. Dole,40 the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia stated that an incident
of physical force toward an employee by a supervisor can create a
hostile environment if it is sufficiently pervasive or patterned, and "if
it is apparently caused by the sex of the harassed employee."
'41
The McKinney court stated that any harassment or other une-
qual treatment of an employee or group of employees that would not
occur but for the sex of the employees may, if sufficiently patterned
or pervasive, comprise an illegal condition of employment under Title
VII.42 The court explicitly rejected the argument that an assault can-
not be sexually discriminatory if it is not explicitly sexual, although
the court added that proving that a pattern of physical force is ille-
gally discriminatory might be significantly more difficult than prov-
ing unlawfulness based upon a pattern of explicitly sexual advances.
Plaintiffs will obviously find it easier to prove that a pattern of ex-
plicit sexual advances occurred a result of the sex of an employee. 4
3
The court, however, interpreted this as simply an evidentiary
problem.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit took a
comparable position when it stated that evidence of threatened physi-
cal violence and incidents of verbal abuse could be considered along
with evidence of two incidents of sexual harassment when deciding
whether a black female security guard established hostile environ-
40. 765 F.2d 1129 (D.C. Cir. 1985). See also Hall v. Gus Constr. Co., 842 F.2d 1010,
1013-14 (8th Cir. 1988) Defendants argued calling one plaintiff "Herpes" was merely
"cruel," that urinating in her gas tank was a practical joke, and that neither of these
occurrences, in addition to a refusal to fix her truck, was sexual harassment. The
court responded that it had never held that sexual harassment or unequal treatment
that occurs because of the sex of the employee must take the form of sexual advances
or have clearly sexual overtones. Id.
41. McKinney, 765 F.2d at 1138.
42. Id. at 1138 n.20 and accompanying text.
43. Id. at 1139 n.21.
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ment sexual harassment." As a Florida District Court stated in 1991,
the key is whether the harassment was based upon sex.
45
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has
stated that, to show unlawful conduct, it is only necessary to establish
that gender was a substantial factor in the discrimination and that a
female [male] would not have been treated in the offensive manner if
she [he] had been a man [woman]. 46 This court recently determined
that the offensive conduct need not include sexual overtones in every
instance, and that each incident need not be sufficiently severe to af-
fect a female employee. The court held that "the pervasive use of de-
rogatory and insulting terms relating to women generally and
addressed to female employees personally may serve as evidence of a
hostile environment." 47 Similarly, the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit held that a supervisor's disparaging re-
marks about the maids' pregnancies could be construed as a form of
sexual harassment.48
The posting of pornographic pictures in common areas and in
employees' work spaces may be unlawful conduct. Robinson v. Jack-
sonville Shipyards, Inc.49 involved male shipyard workers who had
posted pictures of nude and partially nude women and who had made
sexually demeaning remarks and jokes. The court accepted a psy-
chologist's testimony that these pictures "sexualized" the entire work
environment to the detriment of all female employees.50 Accord-
ingly, the posting of these pictures was unlawful sexual harassment.
The psychologist's testimony asserted that stereotyping, or cate-
gorizing defined groups as sharing certain traits, means that individ-
ual members of those groups will eventually be evaluated in these
terms as well. In the process of perceiving people as divided into
groups, persons will tend to maximize the differences among the
groups, exaggerate those differences, and minimize the differences
within the groups. The result is that women are perceived as more
similar to other women and more different from men (and vice
versa) than they may be in reality.
51
44. Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406, 1415 (10th Cir. 1987). The court de-
scribed two incidents of sexual harassment involving one supervisor who rubbed a fe-
male security guard's thigh and a second superivor who touched her breasts. Id. at
1409-10.
45. Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1522 (M.D. Fla.
1991).
46. Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1485 (3d Cir. 1990) (quoting
Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044, 1047 n.4 (3d Cir. 1977)).
47. Id.
48. Hacienda Hotel, 881 F.2d at 1515 n.8.
49. 760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991).
50. Id. at 1505.
51. Id. at 1502.
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According to the Robinson court, "this perceptual process pro-
duces the 'in-group/out-group' phenomenon." 52 Those persons in the
outside group will be viewed less favorably. This can produce dis-
criminatory decisions at the workplace and it may lead to employees
being judged based on qualities unrelated to job performance. Rather
than being judged according to merit, employees who are members of
the outside group will be judged simply upon the stereotype assigned
to the designated group within which they fall. In other words, when
a male supervisor categorizes a female employee based on a sexual
stereotype, that supervisor will evaluate her performance and capa-
bilities in terms of characteristics that comport with the stereotypes
assigned to women, rather than in terms of this individual's job skills
and performance.5
Although stereotyping has been found to be an unlawful prac-
tice, some courts may still find conduct of an explicitly sexual nature
lawful. A trial court found that where no sexual language was ever
directed at a female police officer, although sexual language was used
in the workplace; where only one of the unwelcome mailings that
plaintiff received in her mailbox was pornographic; where the plain-
tiff could not establish the source of these mailings; where one of the
pieces of "artwork" about which the plaintiff complained was placed
in the workplace by another female employee; and where two female
police officers testified that there was no sexual harassment at the
workplace, the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie claim of sex-
ual harassment.54
UNWELCOME
Once an employee can show that there was conduct of a sexual
nature, or conduct based on sex, then he or she must show the con-
duct was unwelcome. As mentioned earlier in this article, in Meritor
Savings Bank, the Supreme Court discussed the term "unwelcome."
The Court distinguished "unwelcomeness" from "voluntariness" and
indicated that an employee's sexually provocative speech or dress is
relevant in determining whether an employee welcomed sexual
advances.
55
In a subsequent case, Swentek v. United States Air, Inc.,56 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit focused on the
term "unwelcome." Numerous witnesses testified at trial that the
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Dwyer v. Smith, 867 F.2d 184, 188 (4th Cir. 1989).
55. See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
56. 830 F.2d 552 (4th Cir. 1987).
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plaintiff, a female employee, was a foul-mouthed individual who fre-
quently talked about sex. In addition, unrebutted testimony revealed
that the plaintiff tried to "loosen up" her supervisor by placing a sex-
ual toy in her mailbox, filled a cup with urine and presented it to an-
other employee as something to drink, and once grabbed a pilot's
genitals while inviting him to join her in a sexual liaison.5 7
The trial court held that the plaintiff's own past behavior and
use of foul language indicated that another pilot's allegedly harassing
conduct and comments were "not unwelcome," even though the
plaintiff had told the alleged harasser to leave her alone.5 8 The trial
judge concluded that this plaintiff could not be offended by these
types of comments and therefore should be regarded as welcoming
them.
59
On appeal, however, the Fourth Circuit concluded that a
"[p]laintiff's use of foul language or sexual innuendo in a consensual
setting does not waive 'her legal protections against unwelcome har-
assment.' 60 The appellate court distinguished Swentek from Mer-
itor Savings Bank. In Meritor Savings Bank, the Supreme Court
found that evidence of plaintiff Vinson's past conduct bore directly
on her relationship with the alleged harasser because she worked
with the harasser, who was her supervisor, on a daily basis.6 1 As a
result, the Supreme Court concluded that Vinson's dress and conver-
sation were relevant in determining whether she welcomed sexual
advances.
By contrast, in Swentek, there was no evidence that the alleged
harasser knew of Swentek's past conduct or that he believed his con-
duct would be welcomed. Under these circumstances, according to
the appellate court, it was improper for the trial judge to suggest that
Swentek's past conduct should be interpreted to mean that she wel-
comed the harasser's behavior.
6 2
Thus, when determining whether certain conduct was unwel-
come, one should explore whether the alleged victim ever expressly
indicated his or her distaste or dislike. One should also distinguish
consensual relationships from nonconsensual circumstances.
A truly consensual relationship is not unwelcome and should not
be considered unlawful sexual harassment, at least as between the
consenting participants. A consensual relationship in the workplace
may, however, result in a hostile environment. The United States
57. Id. at 556. At a second trial, plaintiff denied these occurrences. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 557.
60. Id. at 557 (quoting Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d at 254 n.3).
61. Id.
62. Id.
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Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has acknowledged that, under
certain circumstances, a consensual relationship may fill the work-
place with sexual innuendo and interfere with standard business pro-
cedures such that nonparticipating fellow employees are subjected to
hostile environment sexual harassment.
63
One must also identify the point in time at which a plaintiff indi-
cated his or her preferences regarding certain conduct. In a very re-
cent 1992 case, Burns v. McGregor Electronic Industries, Inc.,64 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed a
trial court's conclusion that certain sexual conduct did not create an
unlawful hostile environment.65 A critical fact for the trial court was
that the plaintiff had previously appeared nude in two motorcycle
magazines. Relying on this evidence, the trial court stated that "[iun
view of [Burns'] willingness to display her nude body to the public in
Easy Riders publications, crude magazines at best, her testimony that
she was offended by sexually directed comments and Penthouse or
Playboy pictures is not credible.
'66
The Eighth Circuit did not accept the trial court's conclusion.
The appellate court acknowledged the Supreme Court's statement
that evidence of a plaintiff's sexually provocative speech or dress is
relevant in determining whether conduct was unwelcome. The
Eighth Circuit also recognized that the plaintiff had repeatedly indi-
cated the conduct was offensive. The court determined that both of
these factors should enter into the trial court's analysis. Accordingly,
the court remanded the case to the trial court with instructions that
the conduct "incited" by the nude photographs should be distin-
guished from conduct that began before the photographs appeared
and that "did not change in kind or intensity after the appearance of
the photos.
'67
63. Drinkwater v. Union Carbide Corp., 904 F.2d 853, 860-62 (3d Cir. 1990) (hold-
ing that there is no unlawful sexual harassment when an employee fails to produce
sufficient evidence to establish that the working environment caused her to suffer
based upon her gender. The court concluded that two comments, standing alone, were
insufficient to show that there was a continuous period of harassment, and thus insuf-
ficient to show an abusive working environment). See infra notes 73-94 and accompa-
nying text for a discussion of what constitutes an "abusive environment."
64. No. 90-2504, (8th Cir. Jan. 30, 1992).
65. Id. slip op. at 7.
66. Id. (quoting the District Court opinion).
67. Id. slip op. at 11-12. It is not entirely clear that an employee's workplace
speech or dress should be considered relevant once he or she has explicitly expressed
distaste for certain types of conduct. By accepting evidence of plaintiff's conduct away
from the workplace, the Eighth Circuit appellate court has gone one step beyond the
Supreme Court's opinion in Meritor Savings Bank and has raised even more serious
questions as to relevancy.
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SEVERE OR PERVASIVE
Conduct of a sexual nature will not be unlawful if it is merely
unwelcome. Among other things, it must also be severe or pervasive.
In an effort to determine whether conduct was unlawful, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit stated that the district
court may combine evidence of sexual hostility with evidence of ra-
cial hostility in making its assessment.
68
In determining whether conduct is pervasive or severe, courts
will not look at alleged incidents in isolation. Rather, they will con-
sider the cumulative effect of allegedly unlawful conduct in its total-
ity. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
explained in 1989, "[w]hat may appear to be a legitimate justification
for a single incident of alleged harassment may look pre-textual
when viewed in the context of several other related incidents."6 9
If there are only a few incidents, but they are particularly offen-
sive, a court may still find unlawful sexual harassment. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit stated in 1991 that "the
required showing of severity or seriousness of the harassing conduct
varies inversely with the pervasiveness or frequency of the
conduct.
'70
A Florida federal district court recently explained that, although
the terms "severe" and "pervasive" do not have a precise definition,
there is an interaction between these two requirements.7 1 As the se-
verity and impact of harassing behavior increases, the level of perva-
siveness required to establish Title VII liability will decline.
According to the court, a holistic perspective is required. One must
keep in mind that each successive episode has its predecessors, that
distinct incidents have a cumulative impact, and that the workplace
atmosphere may be something more than merely the sum of individ-
ual episodes. Thus, even if no single episode created a hostile work-
place, the combination of past and current incidents may lead to the
68. Hicks, 833 F.2d 1406, 1416. It may be possible, however, to construct an argu-
ment in response to a plaintiff's attempt to combine types of discrimination. In De-
graffenreid v. General Motors Assembly Div., St. Louis, 413 F. Supp. 142 (E.D. Mo.
1976), aff'd in par4 rev'd in part on other grounds, 558 F.2d 480 (8th Cir. 1977), the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that black women should
not be considered as an independent Title VII protected class. Rather, to be success-
ful, black women must show that they were discriminated against either because of
gender or because of race. If an employer cannot be held liable for treating black wo-
men differently from the way it treats both black men and white women, one can ar-
gue that it is similarly inappropriate to combine evidence of racial hostility with
evidence of sexual hostility in an effort to prove a hostile environment. See id. at 143.
69. Vance v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 863 F.2d 1503, 1510 (11th Cir. 1989).
70. Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 878 (9th Cir. 1991).
71. Robinson, 760 F. Supp. at 1524.
[Vol. 25
SEXUAL HARASSMENT
conclusion that Title VII has been violated.72
ABUSIVE ENVIRONMENT
Even after proving there was severe or pervasive unwelcome
conduct of a sexual nature, an employee has not established that
there was hostile environment sexual harassment. The employee
must also establish that the harassment affected a term, condition or
privilege of employment. The United States Supreme Court, in Mer-
itor Savings Bank, declared that the harasser's conduct must create
an abusive working environment.
73
Courts have begun to look at this requirement both subjectively
and objectively. As to the subjective requirement, courts will ask
whether the plaintiff/employee has shown that she personally has
been at least as affected as a hypothetical reasonable person would be
under similar circumstances. 74 The subjective factor is deemed criti-
cal because it establishes that the alleged misconduct harmed this
particular plaintiff, giving rise to a claim for judicial relief.75 For ex-
ample, even where the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit was convinced that "a reasonable person would consider the
conduct of [the owners and supervisors] to be sufficiently severe or
pervasive to alter the conditions of employment and create an abu-
sive working environment," the court remanded to the trial court to
"determine whether Burns [the plaintiff] was as affected as that hy-
pothetical 'reasonable person.' "76
The objective standard is intended not only to protect employers
from "hypersensitive" employees, but also to serve the goal of equal
opportunity by removing barriers to employment.7 7 This standard,
however, has been the subject of recent debate.
Several courts have concluded that, when reviewing the objective
requirement, a court must recognize that males and females do not
always perceive the same incident in a similar fashion. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit stated in Andrews that
"[a]lthough men may find these actions harmless and innocent, it is
entirely possible that women may feel otherwise. s7 8 That court di-
rected the trial judge to "look at all the incidents to see if they pro-
duce a work environment hostile and offensive to women of
72. Id.
73. Meritor Say. Bank, 477 U.S. at 67.
74. Robinson, 760 F. Supp. at 1524; Burns, slip op. at 13-14.
75. Andrews, 895 F.2d at 1483.
76. Burns, slip op. at 13-14.
77. Andrews, 895 F.2d at 1483.
78. Id. at 1486 (citing Note, Sexual Harassment Claims of Abusive Work Environ-
ment Under Title VII, 97 HARV. L. REV., 1449, 1451 (1984)).
1992]
CREIGHTON LAW REVIEW
reasonable sensibilities," adding that all the evidence should be
viewed in its totality.
79
In January of 1991, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit announced that it would examine a harasser's allegedly
unlawful conduct from the perspective of a reasonable woman
because:
a sex-blind reasonable person standard tends to be male-bi-
ased and tends to systematically ignore the experiences of
women. The reasonable woman standard does not establish
a higher level of protection for women than men .... In-
stead, a gender-conscious examination of sexual harassment
enables a woman to participate in the workplace on an equal
footing with men.80
The court also stated in that case, Ellison v. Brady,8' that where male
employees allege there has been conduct creating a hostile environ-
ment, the victim's response would be examined from the perspective
of a "reasonable man."
8 2
The persons responsible for the harassment need not realize that
their conduct rises to the level of "abusive." The court in Ellison ex-
plained that the reasonable victim standard classifies conduct as un-
lawful sexual harassment even if the harassers did not understand
that their conduct created a hostile working environment. The court
stated that even well-intentioned compliments can result in sexual
harassment if a reasonable victim of the same sex as the plaintiff
would view the statements as so severe or pervasive that they altered
a condition of employment and created an abusive working environ-
ment.8 3 The Robinson court took a similar position, stating that
"[t]he objective standard asks whether a reasonable person of Robin-
son's sex, that is, a reasonable woman, would perceive that an abu-
sive working environment has been created."' 4
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit took a
more restrictive position in 1986. In Rabidue v. Osceola Refining
Co. ,5 the court declared that, when deciding whether an unlawful
hostile environment existed, it would consider:
the nature of the alleged harassment, the background expe-
79. Id. (emphasis added).
80. Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d at 879.
81. 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991).
82. Id. at 879 n.11.
83. Id. at 880. The court added, however, that "if sexual comments or sexual ad-
vances are welcomed by the recipient, they, of course, do not constitute sexual harass-
ment. Title VII's prohibition of sex discrimination in employment does not require a
totally desexualized workplace." Id. at n.13.
84. Robinson, 760 F. Supp. at 1524.
85. 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987).
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rience of the plaintiff, her co-workers, and supervisors, the
totality of the physical environment of the plaintiff's work
area, the lexicon of obscenity that pervaded the environment
of the workplace both before and after the plaintiffs intro-
duction into its environs, coupled with the reasonable expec-
tation of the plaintiff upon voluntarily entering that
environment.
8 6
The Rabidue court concluded that the presence of actionable sexual
harassment would depend upon the personality of the plaintiff and
the prevailing work environment and that allegations of sexual har-
assment must be considered and evaluated on an ad hoc basis. The
court asserted that the plaintiffs' allegations should be considered
from the perspective of a reasonable person.
8 7
Robinson and Ellison both expressly rejected Rabidue. The Elli-
son court began by asserting that if it analyzed situations from the
perspective of the alleged harasser, by asking whether a reasonable
person would engage in such conduct, it would run the risk of rein-
forcing the prevailing level of discrimination. "Harassers could con-
tinue to harass merely because a particular discriminatory practice
was common, and victims of harassment would have no remedy."88
Instead, allegedly unlawful conduct should be examined from the
perspective of the victim.
The Ellison court stated that, although there is a broad range of
viewpoints among women as a group, many women share common
concerns which men do not necessarily share.
Women who are victims of mild forms of sexual harassment
may understandably worry whether a harasser's conduct is
merely a prelude to violent sexual assault. Men, who are
rarely victims of sexual assault, may view sexual conduct in
a vacuum without a full appreciation of the social setting or
the underlying threat of violence that a woman may
perceive.
89
Moving beyond the question of whether the appropriate standard
is "reasonable woman/man" as opposed to "reasonable person," an-
other important observation about abusive environment is that sex-
ual harassment directed at employees other than the plaintiff can be
used to prove hostile work environment. According to the Tenth Cir-
cuit in Hicks,9° evidence of the overall workplace atmosphere, as dis-
tinguished from evidence of specific hostility directed toward the
86. Id. at 620.
87. Id. (emphasis added). See Burns, slip op. at 13-14.
88. Ellison, 924 F.2d at 878.
89. Id. at 879.
90. 833 F.2d 1406 (10th Cir. 1987).
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plaintiff, is also an important consideration in evaluating allegedly
unlawful hostile environments.91
Several courts have added an additional element to the plain-
tiff's prima facie case. The Rabidue court asserted that, to prevail in
a Title VII action, a plaintiff must prove the alleged sexual miscon-
duct created a hostile environment "that affected seriously the psy-
chological well-being of the plaintiff."92 Similarly, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has stated that, "[t]o succeed
with a hostile environment claim, the plaintiff must first demon-
strate that the harassment interfered on her ability to perform her
work or significantly affected her psychological well-being.
'93
The suggestion that showing a significant impact on psychologi-
cal well-being is properly part of a plaintiff's prima facie hostile envi-
ronment sexual harassment case has been aggressively challenged,
however. Although the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit softened this requirement by stating it in the alterna-
tive, other courts have refused to consider this to be part of a hostile
environment prima facie case.94
EMPLOYER LIABILITY
Although employers are being held liable for unlawful sexual
harassment committed by supervisors and coworkers, the theoretical
basis for these holdings remains somewhat unclear. As mentioned
earlier in this article, Meitor Savings Bank confirmed that an em-
ployer will be held strictly liable for supervisors who engage in quid
pro quo sexual harassment. In that case, however, the Supreme
Court did not articulate a definitive rule regarding employers' liabil-
ity, for hostile environment sexual harassment. Although the Court
instructed lower courts to look to agency principles, it expressly
stated that in hostile environment situations employers will not auto-
matically be held liable for sexual misconduct by their supervisors.
9 5
91. Id. at 1415.
92. Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 619.
93. Paroline v. Unisys Corp., 879 F.2d 100, 105 (4th Cir. 1989) (citing Rabidue, 805
F.2d at 620).
94. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals emphatically rejected this requirement
when it stated "employees need not endure sexual harassment until their psychologi-
cal well-being is seriously affected to the extent that they suffer anxiety and debilita-
tion." Ellison, 924 F.2d at 877-78. Other courts have implicitly rejected this
requirement by omitting it from their description of the plaintiff's prima facie case.
See Hicks, 833 F.2d at 1413 (adopting the Supreme Court's language from Meritor Say.
Bank, which stated that a hostile environment exists when sexual conduct "has the
purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's work performance
or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment.").
95. Meritor Say. Bank, 477 U.S. at 72.
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Thus, the question remains-when will employers be held liable for
hostile environment sexual harassment?
As to harassment by co-workers, courts have handled these cases
in a relatively consistent manner. Employers will be held liable if
they had actual or constructive knowledge of the misconduct and
they did not take prompt remedial action. 96 The question of when an
employer should be held liable for sexual harassment by supervisors,
however, has not been answered as clearly or consistently.
Courts have suggested several distinct bases for holding employ-
ers liable for a supervisor's sexual misconduct. For instance, in
Hirsckfeld v. New Mexico Corrections Department,97 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit cited Hicks for the
proposition that there are three possible bases. First, relying on the
Restatement (Second) of Agency section 219(1) (1958), the court
stated that it is possible to find an employer liable because an agent
was acting within the scope of employment. The court immediately
dismissed this respondeat superior basis of liability, however, as ex-
tremely unlikely and far too narrow. If this were the only basis for
liability, declared the court, employers would become accountable
only if they explicitly required or conscientiously allowed their su-
pervisors to "molest women employees."98
Second, the court explained that an employer may be held liable
96. Hall v. Gus Constr. Co., 842 F.2d 1010, 1015-16 (8th Cir. 1988) (holding the em-
ployer liable for sexual harassment by a co-worker where the employer has reason to
know of the harassment and does nothing in response); Barrett v. Omaha Nat'l Bank,
726 F.2d 424, 427 (8th Cir. 1984) (holding that "sexual harassment by a co-employee is
not a violation of Title VII unless the employer knew or should have known of the
harassment and failed to take immediate and appropriate corrective action."); Guess v.
Bethlehem Steel Corp., 913 F.2d 463, 464-65 (7th Cir. 1990) (repeating that an employer
will not be liable unless the employer knew or should have known of the harassment
but failed to take immediate corrective action and further explaining that the basis of
liability is not respondeat superior, essentially a doctrine of strict liability, but rather
negligence); Marshall v. Nelson Elect., 766 F. Supp. 1018, 1039 (N.D. Okla. 1991). See
also 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(d) (1991). Equal Employment Opportunity Commission regu-
lations assert that "[w]ith respect to conduct between fellow employees, an employer is
responsible for acts of sexual harassment in the workplace where the employer (or its
agents or supervisory employees) knows or should have known of the conduct, unless
it can show it took immediate and appropriate corrective action." Id.
97. 916 F.2d 572 (10th Cir. 1990). Although the court provided a broad analysis of
possible bases for employer liability, it ultimately determined that the Corrections De-
partment Captain responsible for the unlawful conduct had no supervisory authority
over plaintiff's position; that, even though the Captain did have authority over
subordinate security guards, he did not ever invoke that authority to harass the plain-
tiff; and that an occasional delegation of authority over the plaintiff concerning secur-
ity matters did not bring these facts within Restatement § 219(2)(d). Id. at 579-80 n.7
and accompanying text.
98. Hirschfeld, 916 F.2d at 577 (citing Vinson v. Taylor, 753 F.2d 141, 151 (D.C. Cir.
1985), aff'd in part and reversed in part sub. nom. Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477
U.S. 57 (1986)).
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for recklessness or negligence in failing to respond to a hostile work
environment 9 Employers will be found negligent when manage-
ment level employees knew or, in the exercise of reasonable care,
should have known of a hostile or offensive work environment and
the employer fails to correct the situation. Noting that this form of
negligence has occasionally been mischaracterized as respondeat su-
perior, the court explained that, under these circumstances, employ-
ers will be held directly liable for negligence or recklessness.'i °
The court further explained that, under this second standard,
employers can avoid liability by taking prompt remedial action. For
example, in Swentek, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit held that a corporate defendant was not liable for the
hostile work environment created by a pilot. The employer was able
to avoid liability because it responded quickly and effectively. The
employer first confronted the allegedly harassing pilot with the
plaintiff's allegations, then explored the pilot's version of the facts,
and finally determined that it should believe the pilot's denial of the
most serious allegations. Because there did appear to be a problem
with the pilot's comments, however, he received a written warning to
curb his language and to keep away from the plaintiff. He was in-
formed that any further complaints about his language would result
in a suspension. The employer also advised the pilot that it would
continue to monitor his future conduct.
A third possible basis of liability is section 219(2)(d) of the Re-
statement (Second) of Agency.10 1 That section provides that a master
[employer] may be liable for the acts of a servant [employee] acting
outside the scope of delegated authority if "the servant purported to
act or to speak on behalf of the principle and there was reliance upon
apparent authority, or he [she] was aided in accomplishing the tort by
the existence of the agency relationship.'
10 2
In Hirschfeld, the court gave section 219(2)(d) a relatively nar-
row reading. The court rejected the position that an employer could
be held liable where the only way the supervisor "was aided by the
agency relationship in the accomplishment of the tort is that he
would not have been there but for his job."'
1 0 3
It is obviously possible to read this restatement section more
broadly. A more expansive reading would interpret this section as
asserting that a supervisor's authority always aids in harassment be-
99. Id.
100. Id. at n.5.
101. Restatement (Second) of Agency (1958).
102. Id. § 219(2)(d).
103. Hirschfield, 916 F.2d at 579 (quoting Dist. Ct. Op. at 19).
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cause employees understand that supervisors have power and that, as
mere employees, they may suffer if they ignore a supervisor's de-
mands. This fear allows supervisors to commit unlawful action.
In Sparks v. Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc.,10 4 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit announced that, because
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 defines the term "employer" as "a person
engaged in an industry affecting commerce ... and any agent of such
a person,"10 5 if a supervisor was acting as an "agent" of the employer
when he or she sexually harassed an employee, the employer will be
directly liable to the employee for the supervisor's conduct.10 6 The
Sparks court explained that an agent's acts are considered the acts of
the employer and that employers are directly, rather than indirectly,
liable for the unlawful sexual misconduct of their "agents. '10 7 By
comparison, respondeat superior liability is an indirect form of liabil-
ity that arises when the person harassing the plaintiff was not the
statutory "employer."10 8 For example, the court explained, where
the alleged harasser was one of plaintiff's co-workers or was a super-
visor with no authority over plaintiff, this would be a situation where
one should consider respondeat superior liability,
Because Title VII does not define the term "agent," the Sparks
court looked to the Restatement (Second) of Agency for assistance.
Looking to section 219(2)(d), the court stated that a master will not
escape liability merely because a servant was acting entirely in his
own interest if the servant was aided in accomplishing the tort by the
existence of the agency relationship. 10 9 The court observed that:
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
has concluded that a supervisor acts as an "agent" of the em-
ployer for Title VII purposes, thus rendering the employer
directly liable for the supervisor's actions, where [the] super-
visor exercises the authority actually delegated to him by his
employer, by making or threatening to make decisions af-
fecting the employment status of his subordinates." 0
The employer must be held liable under agency principles where it
was the employer's delegation of authority that empowered the su-
pervisor to commit the misconduct, according to the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission."' The Sparks court was sympathetic
104. 830 F.2d 1554 (11th Cir. 1987).
105. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1988).
106. Sparks, 830 F.2d at 1558.
107. Id. at 1558 n.4.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 1559.
110. Id. (quoting Meritor Say. Bank, 477 U.S. at 70(stating, without relying on, the
position of the EEOC in its amicus brief)).
111. Id. At this point, however, the EEOC was simply stating its position regarding
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to this analysis and concluded that the plaintiff had established an is-
sue of material fact as to whether the corporation was directly liable
under Title VII.
The circumstances in Sparks, however, involved both quid pro
quo and hostile environment sexual harassment. The United States
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit stated in Sparks that it did
not need to address the issue of what rule should govern an em-
ployer's liability for its supervisor's sexual harassment where the
claim rested "exclusively" on a hostile environment sexual harass-
ment theory.'1 2 When the Eleventh Circuit was subsequently con-
fronted with a claim alleging only unlawful hostile environment, the
court declared that corporate liability "exists only through respon-
deat superior; liability exists where the corporate defendant knew or
should have known of the harassment and failed to take prompt re-
medial action.""
n 3
Courts thus continue to inquire as to what employers knew
about allegedly unlawful hostile environment sexual harassment, as
well as what they should have known. In EEOC v. Hacienda Ho-
tel," 4 the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit con-
cluded that the prevailing trend is to hold employers liable for failing
to remedy or prevent a hostile or offensive work environment of
which management-level employees knew, or in the exercise of rea-
sonable care should have known.
Employers may be able to avoid problematic situations, and sub-
sequent liability, by adopting an anti-discrimination policy. In Mer-
quid pro quo sexual harassment. The Meitor Say. Bank Court added that the EEOC
suggested in its brief that this "usual basis for a finding of agency will often disappear"
when a sexual harassment complaint asserts only a hostile environment theory. Mer-
itor Say. Bank, 477 U.S. at 70-71. The EEOC position in its brief was that, if an em-
ployer had an explicit policy against sexual harassment and a procedure to resolve
claims, the employer should not be held liable when an alleged victim does not utilize
the complaint procedure and when the employer does not have actual knowledge of
the hostile environment. Md at 71 (citing Amicus Brief for United States and EEOC at
26, Meritor Say. Bank, 477 U.S. 57). The EEOC added that, in any other situation, the
employer should be held liable if the employer had actual knowledge or the victim had
no reasonable avenue for making a complaint. Id. The EEOC guidelines state, on the
other hand, that an employer "is responsible for its acts and those of its agents and
supervisory employees with respect to sexual harassment regardless of whether the
specific acts complained of were authorized or even forbidden by the employer and re-
gardless of whether the employer knew or should have known of their occurrence."
29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(c) (1988).
112. Id. at 1560 n.9.
113. Steele v. Offshore Shipbuilding, Inc., 867 F.2d 1311, 1316 (11th Cir. 1989) (cit-
ing Henson, 682 F.2d at 905; Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 943 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1981);
Meritor Say. Bank, 477 U.S. at 72)). But see Hicks, 833 F.2d at 1418 (stating that the
Restatement (Second) of Agency § 219(2)(d) may provide a basis for holding an em-
ployer liable for unlawful sexual harassment).
114. 881 F.2d 1504 (9th Cir. 1989).
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itor Savings Bank, however, the Supreme Court stated that the mere
existence of a grievance policy and procedure, combined with a com-
plainant's failure to invoke that procedure, will not necessarily pro-
tect the employer from liability."
5
The Supreme Court was not required to directly address the
question of whether a properly drafted anti-discrimination policy will
always protect an employer because the employer's policy in Meritor
Savings Bank was deficient in several respects. The policy of the
bank did not expressly address sexual harassment in particular, and
thus did not inform employees as to their employer's desire to pro-
hibit this conduct. Additionally, the grievance procedure required
employees to first complain to their own supervisors. In Meritor Sav-
ings Bank, the supervisor happened to be the same person who was
harassing the plaintiff.
The employer's anti-discrimination policy was found deficient for
similar reasons in Hacienda Hotel. The United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit concluded that it would be unreasonable
to require discrimination victims to exhaust internal procedures
where the employer's anti-discrimination policy did not specifically
prohibit sexual harassment, and where the policy required initial re-
sort to a supervisor condoning, or engaging in, the harassment."1
6
An anti-discrimination policy that explicitly prohibits sexual har-
assment and that provides alternative avenues for registering a com-
plaint would avoid the deficiencies found in Hacienda Hotel and
Meritor Savings Bank. Such a policy could then be used to support
an employer's claim that sexual misconduct is well beyond a supervi-
sor's delegated authority, and that the employer is committed to both
prevention and prompt corrective action." 7 Although it is not settled
that a properly drafted anti-discrimination policy will necessarily
protect an employer from liability, it is clear that the absence of an
appropriate policy increases the possibility that an employer will be
held liable for unlawful hostile environment sexual harassment.
115. Meritor Say. Bank, 477 U.S. at 72.
116. Hacienda Hotel, 881 F.2d at 1516.
117. If an employer has a clearly worded policy that provides several avenues for
registering a complaint and an employee fails to use the complaint procedure, an em-
ployer may have an additional argument as to why it should not be held liable for un-
lawful hostile environment sexual harassment. When the employee later asserts he or
she was unlawfully sexually harassed, the employer may be able to argue that the fail-
ure to invoke the accessible grievance procedure is evidence that the allegedly unlaw-
ful conduct was not regarded as unwelcome at the time it occurred. See Showalter, 767
F. Supp. at 1211-12.
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REMEDIES
Until President George Bush signed the Civil Rights Act of
1991118 on November 21, 1991, perhaps the most discouraging aspect
of unlawful sexual harassment from the plaintiff's point of view was
the lack of adequate remedies. Under prior law, victims of sexual
harassment were at best limited to backpay, injunctive relief, rein-
statement, and attorneys' fees. 119 Recognizing that harassment con-
tinues to occur in the workplace, it is clear that the threat of these
limited damages has not deterred unlawful behavior.
The lack of adequate remedies was most apparent when an em-
ployee remained on the job and continued to suffer harassment. An
employee might choose to continue to return to a job where she is
sexually harassed for any number of reasons. For instance, an em-
ployee might find a certain job to be perfectly matched with her own
unique training and experience, or she might simply enjoy the work
itself and derive great satisfaction from her accomplishments. Even
if she does not have what would be, in the absence of unlawful con-
duct, the "perfect" job, an employee might not be able to find an-
other job that pays the same salary, or any other job at all. She thus
might be compelled by economic necessity to return to a workplace
that it is tainted by unlawful conduct. Her financial obligations may
be so pressing that she might endure behavior that would support a
constructive discharge finding if she could afford to quit.
An employee who continued to work at the same position was
obviously not eligible for back pay or reinstatement. If this employee
pursued her charge through both the administrative process and a
civil lawsuit and was ultimately successful, under prior law she
would have been rewarded with only injunctive relief and, possibly,
attorney's fees. Because the potential rewards that could result from
civil litigation were relatively meager, and because litigation itself
can be financially and emotionally exhausting, it might have ap-
peared that the only realistic choices under prior law were either to
118. Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 102(a)(1), 105 Stat. 1071 (1992).
119. "If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in or is in-
tentionally engaging in an unlawful employment practice charged in the complaint,
the court may enjoin the respondent from engaging in such unlawful employment
practice, and order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may include,
but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without back pay
... , or any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
5(g) (1988). "In any action or proceeding under this subchapter the court, in its discre-
tion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the commission or the United States, a
reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1988). The at-
torneys' fees section is also applicable to suits brought by employees of the federal gov-
ernment. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(d) (1988).
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continue to suffer the harassment or, instead, quietly leave the work-
place and find another job.
In Dockter v. Rudolph Wolff Futures, Inc.,120 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reached a conclusion that
illustrates how difficult it was to recover damages. In that case, a fe-
male employee's supervisor repeatedly sexually harassed her during
her first two weeks of employment. On her first day at work, her su-
pervisor asked her to join him to meet a client at a luncheon appoint-
ment. As it turned out, the supervisor misrepresented the purpose of
the luncheon and used the opportunity to ask her what she would be
doing that evening. When she said she was meeting her roommate,
he insisted on accompanying her when she went to her roommate's
office. 121
Ms. Dockter was also subjected to harassment at the workplace.
She testified that her supervisor would come into her office, lock the
door, sit down and stare at her.12 2 She alleged that he "played with
her hair on several occasions" and, on one occasion when she was
bent over, he came up behind her, grabbed her by the waist and said
"I could drive you crazy. ' 123 She also asserted that he frequently
called her at her home during these two weeks requesting that she
meet him at various locations. Her description of her supervisor's be-
havior was corroborated by other female employees who were sub-
jected to the same treatment.
124
The final act of sexual misconduct occurred at the end of these
first two weeks of employment. Her supervisor asked her to join him
after work to meet with clients at a restaurant. As he had at the ear-
lier luncheon appointment, he again insisted on sitting on the same
side of the booth as she did. Again, no clients ever materialized. He
attempted to kiss her several times and, in response, she asked him
to take her home. The supervisor did apologize, but tried to kiss her
again and fondled her breast when they arrived at her apartment.
Although the Seventh Circuit determined that this conduct did
create a hostile work environment, the court concluded that Ms.
Dockter did not allege or prove an injury that could be remedied
under Title VII's equitable provisions.125 It was undisputed that her
supervisor's misconduct ended when he was reprimanded the evening
that they went to dinner. Consequently, the court decided that
"[e]ven if her initial two-weeks were 'hostile' such as to be actionable
120. 913 F.2d 456 (7th Cir. 1990).
121. Id. at 459.
122. Id. at 460.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
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under Title VII, in the absence of any continuing sexual harassment
or discharge based on that sexual harassment, Ms. Dockter cannot
obtain relief under Title VII.' 126 This result was proper, according to
the Seventh Circuit, because the remedial provisions of Title VII al-
lowed for only equitable relief, and did not contemplate nominal,
compensatory, or punitive damages.
127
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 has dramatically changed this situa-
tion. Section 102(a) provides that in an action alleging unlawful in-
tentional discrimination, the complaining party may recover
compensatory and punitive damages in addition to any relief author-
ized by Section 706 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.128 Subsection
(b)(1) provides that a complaining party may recover punitive dam-
ages if he or she can show that the respondent acted with malice or
reckless indifference.' 9 Subsection (b)(2) explains that compensa-
tory damages (which include emotional pain and suffering, mental
anguish, and other nonpecuniary losses) will not include back pay, in-
terest on back pay, or any other type of relief authorized under sec-
tion 706(g), and (b)(3) limits the sum of compensatory damages,
punitive damages and other non-economic losses to a range of $50,000
to $300,000, depending upon the size of the employer.'
30
126. Id. at 461.
127. Id. (citing King v. Bd. of Regents, 898 F.2d 533, 537 (7th Cir. 1990); Bohen v.
City of East Chicago, 799 F.2d 1180, 1184 (7th Cir. 1986).
128. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-66, § 102(a)(1), 105 Stat. 1071 (1992).
Section 102(a)(1) states:
In an action brought by a complaining party under Section 706 or 717 of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e-5) against a respondent who engaged
in unlawful intentional discrimination (not an employment practice that is un-
lawful because of its disparate impact) prohibited under Section 703, 704 or
717 of the Act (42 U.S.C. 2000e-2 or 2000e-3), and provided that the com-
plaining party cannot recover under section 1977 of the Revised Statutes (42
U.S.C. 1981), the complaining party may recover compensatory and punitive
damages as allowed in subsection (b), in addition to any relief authorized by
section 706(g) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, from the respondent.
Id.
129. Id. § 102(b)(1). Section 102(b)(1) states:
(1) DETERMINATION OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES.-A complaining party
may recover punitive damages under this section against a respondent
(other than a government, government agency or political subdivision) if
the complaining party demonstrates that the respondent engaged in a dis-
criminatory practice or discriminatory practices with malice or with reck-
less indifference to the federally protected rights of an aggrieved
individual.
Id.
130. Id. § 102(b)(2)-(3). Section 102(b)(2)-(3) states:
(2) EXCLUSIONS FROM COMPENSATORY DAMAGES.-Compensatory
damages awarded under this section shall not include backpay, interest on
backpay, or any other type of relief authorized under section 706(g) of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.
(3) LIMITATIONS.-The sum of the amount of compensatory damages
awarded under this section for future pecuniary losses, emotional pain,
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In addition to increasing the damages that may be recovered for
unlawful sexual harassment, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 makes an-
other significant change. Section 102(c) provides that, for the first
time, victims of intentional discrimination are entitled to have their
Title VII cases tried before a jury.131 Many plaintiffs, and plaintiffs'
attorneys, may believe that-their chances of establishing liability, as
well as their prospects for recovering compensatory and punitive
damages, have significantly improved because a jury trial is available.
Many victims who previously did not file charges because they
doubted whether it would be worth the disruption to their lives now
have a much greater incentive to challenge unlawful conduct. Even
with these expanded remedies and the right to a jury trial, however,
many victims will not be eager to file sexual harassment charges.
One reason is that, as discussed earlier, a plaintiff in a sexual harass-
ment case must prove the harasser's conduct was unwelcome.
In Meritor Savings Bank, the United States Supreme Court de-
clared that evidence of a complainant's sexually provocative speech
or dress will be relevant in determining whether he or she found par-
ticular sexual advances unwelcome. 132 Consequently, during the in-
vestigation and trial, the complainant's own conduct will become the
subject of an intense and broad-reaching inquiry. This type of exami-
nation may still be sufficient to deter a significant number of victims.
Nonetheless, the expanded damages will likely encourage many vic-
tims to come forward and file charges.
suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, and
other nonpecuniary losses, and the amount of punitive damages awarded
under this section, shall not exceed, for each complaining party-
(A) in the case of a respondent who has more than 14 and fewer than 101
employees in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or
preceding calendar year, $50,000;
(B) in the case of a respondent who has more than 100 and fewer than 201
employees in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or pre-
ceding calendar year, $100,000; and
(C) in the case of a respondent who has more than 200 and fewer than 501
employees in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or pre-
ceding calendar year, $200,000; and
(D) in the case of a respondent who has more than 500 employees in each
of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar
year, $300,000.
Id.
131. Id § 102(c). Section 102(c) states:
(c) JURY TRIAL.-If a complaining party seeks compensatory or punitive
damages under this section-
(1) any party may demand a trial by jury; and
(2) the court shall not inform the jury of the limitations described in sub-
section (b)(3).
Id.
132. Meritor Sat. Bank, 477 U.S. at 69.
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CONCLUSION
Although the requirements for establishing unlawful quid pro
quo sexual harassment are relatively straightforward, there is still
significant confusion surrounding unlawful hostile environment sex-
ual harassment. Courts essentially agree that plaintiffs alleging hos-
tile environment sexual harassment must show there was severe or
pervasive unwelcome conduct of a sexual nature, or based on sex,
that created an abusive working environment. There is not complete
agreement, however, as to the specific nature of each of these factors.
A relatively recent development is that courts are beginning to differ
as to whether allegedly unlawful conduct should be viewed from the
perspective of a reasonable person, or a reasonable woman [man].
Courts have not agreed as to when employers should be held lia-
ble for their supervisors' hostile environment sexual harassment.
Employees often only understand that supervisors have power, and
employees are not always informed as to the precise limits of that
power. One can make a strong argument that employers give super-
visors a broad cloak of authority which always aids harassers in their
misconduct. Courts should thus seriously consider holding employers
liable for unlawful sexual harassment under Restatement (Second)
Agency section 219(2)(d), and employers should review the conduct
of their supervisors.
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 has significantly increased the rem-
edies for unlawful sexual harassment. Judges and juries may not
hesitate to award the full measure of the new damages for at least
two reasons. First, judges and jurors are increasingly aware that sex-
.ual misconduct continues to occur and that the limited damages pre-
viously available have proven inadequate to deter unlawful behavior.
Second, because sexual harassment often occurs in the absence of
witnesses, many employees will not be able to satisfy a preponder-
ence of the evidence burden of proof. Judges and juries may respond
with a significant award to those plaintiffs who are successful in or-
der to send a clear message to other offending employers. Accord-
ingly, although many employers do respond effectively to allegations
of sexual harassment, it is now time for the remaining employers to
recognize the seriousness of such allegations.
[Vol. 25
